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ii 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT UTAH STATE BARfS STATEMENT OF THE 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
Though other questions may be reached oy m i s court as 
stated on Page 5 of the Brief of Appellant, the ultimate issue 
now before this court is whether the complaint of 
Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Ernest L. Bailey and Sharon S. Bailey 
("Baileys") sets forth a cause of action upon which relief may be 
granted. The issue presented by the Defendant/Appellee Utah 
State Bar ("State Bar") is but one issue that this court may or 
may not decide to address. If the Utah Supreme Court finds that 
the Baileys' complaint does set forth a cause of action upon 
which relief may be granted, it may not be necessary to decide 
whether Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar provides complete immunity for the State Bar and its 
employees. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
The State Bar can be sued for the tortious or wrongful acts 
of its employees. The State Bar is structured and established as 
the administrative arm of the judicial branch of Utah's state 
government. There is no justification for the State Bar to be 
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treated any differently or possess any protection from private 
law suits beyond that afforded any governmental agency. 
The primary case relied upon by the State Bar, Holmstead v. 
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972), is 
distinguishable from the case at bar and its reasoning is 
outdated and inapplicable to this matter. The reasoning of the 
majority opinion in Holmstead attempted to follow the common law 
rule that when one tort-feasor is released all are released. 
Since Holmstead, this rule has been abandoned by both the 
legislature, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-42 (1953 as amended), 
and by this Court in Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349 (1986). 
In Utah, the release or exoneration of one tort-feasor does not 
release any other tort-feasor. Further, the claimed derivative 
nature of an employer's liability based upon the acts of an 
employee, is irrelevant to the imposition of liability upon that 
employer. 
The State Bar, by offering its services via Bar Counsel, 
does accept the responsibility of an attorney-client relationship 
with those individuals who seek the advise and assistance of Bar 
Counsel because of Bar Counsel's unique expertise and knowledge 
in the area of disciplinary proceedings. By negotiating with Mr. 
Calder on behalf of the Baileys, the State Bar and Bar Counsel 
did accept the responsibility of an attorney-client relationship 
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and thus should not have suggested that the Bailey's should 
return to Mr. Calder to have their legal work completed. In the 
least, Bar Counsel should have told the Bailey's to seek the 
opinion of other lawyers in addition to that of Mr. Calder's. 
Such a statement by Bar Counsel would not violate the prohibition 
of disclosing disciplinary information regarding its members and 
would have also provided the Bailey's with an opportunity to have 
their legal rights and options evaluated by an impartial third 
party. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE BAR CAN BE SUED FOR THE TORTIOUS OR WRONGFUL 
ACTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES. 
Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar provides as follows: 
Disciplinary personnel immune from Civil Suit. All members 
of the Committee, Board, hearing committees, Bar Counsel, 
disciplinary staff and other persons duly authorized to act 
in disciplinary proceedings under these rules shall be 
absolutely immune from civil suit or liability for any 
conduct in the course of their official responsibilities. 
The State Bar in their response brief makes the bald statement 
that Rule XVI(a) provides a, "broad immunity" that would extend 
beyond the individuals named in the Rule to the entire State Bar, 
No support is provided for such an interpretation except that it 
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is claimed that the State Bar is similar to a corporation and 
thus pursuant to Holmstead v. Abbot GM Diesel Inc., 493 P.2d 625 
(Utah 1972), can only be liable as a master under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. 
In making these statements the State Bar ignores controlling 
facts and law. If the State Bar's speculation as to what, if 
anything, was intended beyond the simple language of Rule XVI(a) 
is correct, it would be in direct conflict with Rule (A)l of the 
Rules of Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar. Rule 
(A)l is very clear in stating that, "The Utah State Bar may sue 
and be sued,..." There is absolutely no reason to believe that 
Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline was intended to go 
beyond its clear and simple language or that Rule XVI(a) was to 
negate the straight forward statements of this Court when it 
promulgated Rule (A)l of the Rules for Integration and Management 
of the Utah State Bar. 
POINT II 
THE LAW RELIED UPON BY THE STATE BAR IS DISTINGUISHABLE AND 
ITS REASONING IS OUTDATED AND INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
In its Response Brief, the State Bar relies primarily upon 
Holmstead v. Abbot GM Diesel Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972). 
Holmstead purports to stand for the proposition that if a 
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master's or employer's liability is based upon the doctrine of 
respondeat superior and that employer's agent or employee is 
exonerated from liability, the employer is similarly exonerated 
from such liability. Holmstead is distinguishable from the 
instant case, the opinion has been criticized, its dissenting 
opinion has been said to be better reasoned, and its holding has 
been overruled or abandoned by both the legislature and this 
Court. 
In Holmstead, the plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against a 
corporate defendant alleging that the defendant's employee 
negligently caused plaintiff injuries and property loss as a 
result of a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff and 
agent/employee entered into a settlement and a covenant not to 
sue. The Plaintiff then attempted to bring an action for the 
recovery of damages against the employer. With Judges Ellett and 
Tuckett dissenting, this Court ruled that under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior a master's liability to a third person is 
derivative and secondary and the exoneration of the servant 
exonerates the master. 
In the instant case, however, the Bailey's (the injured 
third party) did not enter into any contract or agreement to 
exonerate any parties from liability. Rule XVI(a) of the 
Procedures of Discipline do protect certain specified individuals 
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including Bar Counsel from civil suit or liability for any 
conduct in the course of their official responsibilities. Rule 
XVI(a), howesver, should not be treated the same as an agreement 
freely entered into by the parties. In enacting Rule XVI(a), the 
Supreme Court, did not intend to protect the entire State Bar 
from any civil suit or liability. By promulgating such a Rule 
the Supreme Court merely decided to waive any rights the State 
Bar might have otherwise had with respect to indemnity or 
subrogation claims against its employees. 
In 1986, this Court looked at a similar question to that 
presented in Holmstead. In Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349 
(Utah 1986), this Court stated that Holmstead followed the common 
law rule that release of one tort-feasor released all other tort-
feasors. This Court went on to state that: 
The background of Section 78-27-42, enacted in 1973 as 
part of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, Sections 
78-27-39 to -43, indicated that it was designed to 
reverse the common law rule. Krukiewicz, at 1351. 
The derivative nature of the employer's liability is of 
no concern to the victim, and he can compel either the 
employer or the employee to compensate him for the 
whole of his damages. Id. 
Further, this Court found that the basis of liability among 
joint tort-feasors is not relevant. The point being, that both 
the employer and the employee are at least, "severally liable for 
the same injury to plaintiff." Id. 
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Finally, the State Bar's liability is not based solely upon 
the doctrine of respondeat superior as it was in Holmstead. The 
State Bar's liability is based upon numerous grounds. First, the 
State Bar may be held liable as an agency under the governmental 
immunity statutes. The State Bar's initial premise that it is 
analogous to a corporation is erroneous. The State Bar is the 
administrative arm of the judicial branch of the Utah state 
government. There is no justification for this agency to be 
treated any differently than the administrative arm of any other 
branch of state government. Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-30-10 
(1953 as amended). 
Second, this court has specifically stated at Rule (A)l of 
the Rules of Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar 
that the State Bar can be sued. Third, the release of one joint 
tort-feasor does not release any other tort-feasors. Krukiewicz, 
725 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-42 
(1953 as amended). Thus, the State Bar's reliance upon Holmstead 
is misplaced and its arguments are inapplicable to the case at 
bar. 
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POINT III 
THE STATE BAR AND ITS EMPLOYEES DO HAVE A DUTY TO ACT 
RESPONSIBLY, 
The State Bar attempts to argue that it could not have 
protected the Baileys from Mr. CalderTs negligent actions and 
that it had no duty to assist the Baileys in obtaining or at 
least seeking out competent legal advice. Rule VI(a) of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar may provide that 
certain disciplinary matters may not be disclosed to the public, 
but the State Bar and Bar Counsel could have protected the 
Baileys without disclosing any "confidential" information about 
Mr. Calder. The Bar and Bar Counsel could have fulfilled their 
duty by merely suggesting that the Baileys seek the opinion of a 
lawyer other than Mr. Calder to evaluate Mr. Calderfs conduct and 
to determine the most appropriate actions to be taken in the 
Bankruptcy Court. Instead, after negotiating with Mr. Calder on 
behalf of the Baileys, Bar Counsel merely told the Baileys to 
return to Mr. Calder and he would continue representing them at a 
discounted rate. 
The State Bar now seeks to avoid any liability by claiming 
that no attorney-client relationship existed between the State 
Bar and the Baileys. By negotiating with Mr. Calder on behalf of 
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the Baileys, however, the Bar did accept the responsibility of an 
attorney-client relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The Baileys have been hurt by the conduct of the State Bar 
and its Bar Counsel. The State Bar is in a unique position of 
responsibility in the community. This responsibility should not 
be taken lightly. There is no justification for the State Bar or 
its Counsel to practice law and provide legal advise and not be 
held to at least the same standard of care as the rest of the 
legal community which the State Bar is supposed to oversee. 
For the reasons stated above, and for the sake of the 
public's perception of the role of the Utah State Bar in being 
the liaison between the community and the legal profession, the 
Baileys respectfully request this Court to reverse the trial 
court's decision to dismiss the Bailey's complaint, and grant the 
Baileys an opportunity to have their day in court. 
DATED this 5th day of September, 1990. 
By: - - <- _/_ 
STEVEN P. ROWE ' 
Counsel for Plaintiffs/appellants 
Ernest L. Bailey and 
Sharon S. Bailey 
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